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ABSTRACT

When local school board members in New York City assumed office on 31 local school boards in 1969, this should have resulted in more responsive local boards with sufficient power to control local policy; but this was not the actual result. Specific examination of the decentralization bill, the politics of the election, and the election procedures increases understanding of the present makeup of the boards and their capacity for reform of educational policies. The influence of the churches and other organized groups with self-interest motives was overwhelming; the Decentralization Act itself created many obstacles; and the Board of Education and the Board of Elections abdicated their responsibilities in this election. Finally, the election procedure of proportional representation completed the process which blocked the election of a sufficient percentage of "grass roots" people to these boards. (Author/DM)

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THE SCHOOL ELECTIONS:

A Critique of the 1969 New York City School Decentralization

by Boulton H. Demas

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PART I: *The Decentralization Law*

On the first of July, 1970, 279 local school board members assumed office on the thirty-one local school boards. Thus, the educational system was legally, if not actually, decentralized. Theoretically, decentralization should lead to more responsive local boards with sufficient power to control local educational policy. But the 1969 Act provided no real delegation of power to the local boards and the elections have raised serious questions about the quality of the boards.

After 5 years of compromise and conflict over what should constitute decentralization or community control it now seems appropriate to review the 1970 local school board elections, with particular reference to the decentralization bill, the politics of the election and the election procedures. Such an examination would enable us to understand the present make-up of these boards, and would also give some indications as to the potentiality of these boards for instituting policies and programs capable of reforming the public educational system of New York City.

The results of the elections were discomforting. The influence of the churches, especially the Catholic church whose educational interests lay with its own parochial school system rather than with public schools and other organized groups was overwhelming; the decentralization act created many obstacles, and the abdication of certain responsible bodies—the Board of Elections and Board of Education—was yet a third factor. Finally, the election procedure of proportional representation weaved these three elements into a formidable barrier which blocked the election of a sufficient percentage of grass roots people to these boards.

Community people suffer from organizational liabilities within the political systems which frustrate their efforts to participate effectively in the decision-making process. In all too many cases (the 1970 LSB election not withstanding) the substantive measures based on which they tried to organize, often prove elusive—because the rules of the game by which they fought were counterproductive to their success. Success for these groups must be based upon a change of those rules, but, alas, such changes involve political battles, which, in infinite regress, would be won by the other more organized participants to the struggle.

Many adherents of proportional representation for instance, glibly asserted that proportional representation worked well despite the unrepresentativeness of the boards (representativeness, even by their criteria of accurate mathematical correspondence or reflection). They agreed that the boards are unrepresentative but point out that the results were occasioned more from the boycotts and prevailing lower-class political apathy than from the militating factors of proportional representation.

But their failure to grasp the significance of the boycott is an essential point which must be examined. The boycott resulted from a disillusionment with the decentralization bill which granted very few powers to the local school boards. Community people thought that to be elected to powerless boards would be an act of folly. Experience has taught them not to grasp at the shadow of the bone and lose the bone. Even in districts heavily populated by blacks where there were no boycotts, organized groups rode rough-shod to victory.

The decentralization bill, with its registration, nomination, districting procedures and so on, has been analyzed to see how these procedures contributed to victory for some and failure for others; following this, the processes of proportional representation are examined formally and operationally to see the relationship between the

political strategies developed and the characteristics of the winners. From these two factors the politics of the elections grew. In this aspect the two main strategies employed by candidates, independent candidacies and the formation of slates, were examined.

By looking at the frequency with which a high percentage of slate candidates won as compared to a few independents; by identifying the type of slates on which they ran and by looking at these distributions in white and minority districts while holding the boycott factor constant, I intend to present an objective evaluation of the 1970 school board elections.

Analysis

The school board elections show that of the 279 members elected to the boards throughout the city, 16.8% (47) are black, 10.8% (30) are Puerto Rican, 72% (201) are white, and .4% (1) is of Chinese stock.[1]

Racial Imbalance

In 6 districts (2, 11, 18, 23, 27, 28) with a population of black and Puerto Rican pupils ranging from 30 to 48 percent, only 5 of the 54 school board members are non-white. In 12 districts which are predominantly black or Puerto Rican (with over 85% of the school population) only six (4, 5, 7, 9, 16, 23) have boards with a majority of black or Puerto Rican members. In contrast, the other six (1, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19) have no less than 5 and as many as 7 white members distributed as follows: 5 in District 1, 5 in District 13, 6 each in District 12, 14 and 17 and 7 in District 19. Thus, in these 18 districts, only 64 local school board members out of a total of 162 are black and/or Puerto Rican, with 94 going to whites. A further breakdown of the figures show that a little more than 50% (44 out of a total of 87) of the minority members of the local school boards city-wide are concentrated in 6 districts (4, 5, 7, 9, 16 and 23) while the remaining 43 minority members are scattered throughout the remaining 25 districts. Of these, 10 districts—15, 28, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27 and 31 with 66, 29, 21, 29, 11, 33, 29, 15, 32 and 11% minority school population respectively elected all white school boards. This is significant since even in districts where the white school population is as low as .1% (District 23 in Brooklyn) 1 white was elected to the Board; District 1 with 9% and District 4 with 2%, District 7 with 2%, District 12 with 5%, District 13 with 5%, District 14 with 10% and district 16 with 9% elected 6, 3, 2, 6, 5, 6, 2 (30) white members respectively. Furthermore, there was only one district (#5 in Manhattan) where no whites were elected to the boards city-wide. In contrast, there were 10 local school boards with no minority group member.

Board Member Profile

Occupation: 63.8% of board members hold professional, technical or managerial positions; 10.3% are employed as para-professionals or by poverty agencies; 5.3% are clergymen; 16.6% are housewives, while 4.0% are employed as laborers, mechanics or other quasi-skilled or unskilled low-paying jobs. Appendix II.

Age: The average age of the members is 41.8, ranging from 18 years to 68 years.

Family Size: 81.9% of the local school board members are married, having an

average of 2.2 children per household. 46.8% of them now have children in the public schools; 53.2% of them send their children to parochial schools with 8.5% among this latter group sending pre-school children to parochial schools. (Appendix II)

Residence: 11.8% resided in the districts in which they won for less than 5 years. 31.2% lived in districts for from 5 to 15 years, while more than half (57.0%) resided in their districts for over fifteen years. (Appendix II)

Religious Identification: 36.0% are Jewish, 50.6% are Catholic, 11.2% are Protestant.[2]

This gives us a profile of the school board member as a white male Catholic, professionally or technically trained, with two children and living in his district for about 9 years. Two very important questions come to mind. How did this come about? Secondly, is this result consonant with the ideas and objectives of decentralization? In other words, could decentralization (interpreted as the control of schools in the community by a majority of the residents) work effectively in all the districts as they are presently constituted? This second question will be answered in the latter half of the study where there will be an examination into the potentiality of these boards for instituting the needed reforms in the school system. There, a comparison of the former, large, city-wide boards will be made to both the demonstration districts and the present local school boards in terms of the background (occupational, educational and political activism) of their staff. (Appendix VI)

As to how this profile of the local school board member developed we will take a brief, but comprehensive look at the various sections of the decentralization law, its procedures, the powers it granted to the local school boards, and its electoral mechanism of proportional representation. (Appendices IV and V respectively)

The Decentralization Bill

The decentralization bill was proposed when the three demonstration districts—Ocean Hill-Brownsville, I.S. 201, and Two Bridges—were engaged in bitter struggles for their existence. The teachers strike and the confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville over teachers' rights and community power were used as indicators of structural weaknesses in the demonstration districts. As a result, once the need for change was accepted by all the participants in the struggle, an alternative was sought in the State Legislature. "History," Rhody McCoy said "will one day clearly show that the actions of this community (Ocean Hill-Brownsville) were instrumental in bringing together a sufficient number of change agents to force the Board of Education and the UFT, as well as politicians and foundations, to declare publicly their support for change."[3]

Effective February 16th, 1970, Article 52-A redesigned the New York School System, establishing a community school district system in New York City. This Act replaced the basic provisions of the Marchi Act of 1969 which authorized the city board to delegate any or all of its powers to the local boards. The process of change had begun with the Marchi Act. Through it the legislature amended the state education law by changing the composition of the city board of education and modifying the provisions regarding the status and functions of local school boards.

Under the provisions of the new law in May, 1969, the old city board was replaced by a new "interim board" of five members with each member appointed by a different Borough president. From the date of its appointment until the election of a permanent board, the interim board was given all of the powers of the old city

board. Inclusive in this grant of powers was the authority to increase or decrease the powers of the then present local school boards. In addition, under the decentralization plan the interim board was empowered to establish from thirty to thirty-three new community school districts and to administer the election of these community school boards.

If the local school boards are to be truly responsive to the needs of the communities they are supposed to serve, their composition, as well as, the means of selecting them are crucial to their eventual success. The Bundy Plan for decentralizing city schools, giving ample power over policy to local boards, serves as a touchstone. According to Bundy the process of selection should be designed "to balance the desire for the greatest possible parental participation with the need for successive safeguards against excessive bloc voting, partisan politics, and other non-educational influences in school affairs . . . for the few studies that have analyzed school elections indicate that participation in voting for school boards is limited, particularly in ghetto communities. In addition, . . .in large cities political machines often attempt to control school elections, even though they may be nonpartisan."[4]

The decentralization bill spelled out the procedures designed to bring about the effective parental and community participation discussed above.

The five areas of the bill which bore directly upon the outcome of the elections included districting, nominations, registration and voting, powers of the local school boards and proportional representation. Although no analysis of the outcome of the elections can be meaningful without a discussion of these elements, it is appropriate to first look into the general premises of the selection process.

Process of Selection

The question of the selection process became important when the Interim Board of Education decided to abandon the system of appointed local school board members. The board thought that selection on this basis was incompatible with the degree of authority and responsibility which the local school boards should have.

Three options for determining who shall elect the community school boards were considered—parents only, a mixed selection process or any resident within the district. The limitation of board membership to parents of public school children only was not upheld. It was the concern of many that education is too vital a community-wide interest to exclude residents who are not parents from membership on these boards. Moreover, community school boards "should not be deprived of the special skills, experience, interests or insights of parents whose children have finished school or do not yet have children in the schools or even other capable residents who are not parents."[5]

Appointment and Election

This dual election process, whereby all groups would be represented without the dangers of direct election was the proposal of the Bundy Report, but it was also eliminated. The objections were that the Bundy procedures were too complex and that the safeguards for effective parental representation could be easily subverted by one of the six democratically-elected members siding with the appointed bloc of five members.

Direct Elections

Direct elections was the method adopted by the Albany legislators and which was incorporated into the decentralization bill. The proponents of this mechanism reasoned

that since the local boards were to have direct control of expenditures, any mechanism short of direct elections would be tantamount to taxation without representation. This argument of taxation without representation was refuted on the ground that the districts would not have taxing powers and that the voters would still retain the right to express their sentiments on taxation for schools when electing city and state officials.

The opponents of direct election cited the danger of "domination by political clubs; the expense to candidates of campaigning; the distastefulness of election campaigns to men and women who would otherwise be willing to serve on the Community School Boards, and the possible domination of school affairs by majorities of residents who were not parents or by sectarian interests that might not hold the interests of public education uppermost".[6]

Districting

The law provided that no district may contain fewer than 20,000 elementary and junior high school pupils in "average daily attendance". In drawing the district boundaries, the interim board was mandated to observe four criteria: suitable size for efficiency, convenient location for pupil attendance, "reasonable" number of pupils and "heterogeneity" (ethnic and socio-economic mixture) of pupil population.

Suitable Size for Efficiency

In converting the decentralized districts to a city-wide program, the legislature ignored the advantages of the small districts, establishing districts consisting of a minimum of 20,000 pupils, with most districts containing upwards of 30,000 students.

On the one hand, the Bundy Report suggested the creation of districts through Intermediate and Junior High School clusters, numbering from about forty to fifty. The exact number and shape of these new districts would be determined with great care in order to insure boundaries that are both educationally sensible and socially sound.

Bundy proposed that the determination of these clusters should "take account of such factors as a sense of community, efficient utilization of school buildings, school feeder patterns, the number of pupils who would have to transfer from schools they presently attend and the diversity in composition of student population."[7] Bundy was convinced that these criteria would assure school districts large enough to be educationally viable, while avoiding the fragmentation and economic inefficiency of smaller districts. Another factor in favor of districts smaller than that outlined in the decentralization bill was the demonstration districts. The demonstration districts suggested that parents can participate effectively in the educational lives of their children when the school districts are small and manageable.

Convenient Location for Pupil Attendance

It seemed obvious to the legislators that to ensure racial harmony and a workable educational system, all those with an interest in the outcome should participate in determining the boundaries. But, although the legislature called for a community role the Board of Education, circumscribed by legislative requirements for size, devised the district lines arbitrarily, resulting in the preservation of the old existing lines and without community consultation.

The arbitrariness of drawing the district lines and without community consultation provoked a court case in District 1 in Manhattan. In this district, the lines under decentralization were drawn so badly that the members of the school board would have come from one part of the district while the schools were in the other. The dispro-

portionate majority of regular voters over parent voters presumably helped the plaintiffs in winning their case against the Board of Education.

Heterogeneity

The Bundy Report called for a heterogeneity that recognized not only different races or ethnics, but different public services. It recommended "that community school districts should be drawn to encourage and facilitate greater consideration with other governmental efforts serving human needs in the city . . . for the well-being of children is affected by health services, and the physical planning of housing and local institutions is of concern to their parents."[8] This interlocking, by developing strong bridges between city schools and other public agencies in the communities can cause the schools themselves with their parent-leaders to become true local institutions which would influence the shape and sense of community in the various districts in the city.

Many community residents questioned the bill's concept of heterogeneity, arguing that it was used by the Interim Board of Education to create districts in which blacks and Puerto Ricans could have no voting majorities. The suit in Manhattan's District 1 is illustrative.

A further consequence of leaving the community out of the consultations with regards to the drawing of district boundaries led to the gerrymandering of District 28 in Queens. Here, the old district was redrawn under the pretext of promoting heterogenity while facilitating integration. However, the new North-South district lines resulted in the election of a non representative school board.

In this district which has a 41% black and 6% Puerto Rican school population, six whites from Forest Hills, Rego Park and Kew Gardens dominate the board over the three blacks from South Jamaica, Springfield Gardens and Richmond Hill. From this, it is evident that the North-South districting, rather than promoting integration as was intended, fueled the creation of all black schools, such as P.S. 8, in southern Queens. It further led to the one-way bussing of school children from South to North.

This dilemma could have been avoided if the opinions which were constantly articulated by the black community of District 28 were listened to. They thought that the district lines should have been drawn with an East-West orientation. This method would have created black contiguous ethnic districts, capable of increasing black representation on the local school board.

Because of this under-representation of blacks, resulting from the gerrymandered district lines, constant friction exists on the local school board. Two opposing blocs have been formed—a six member white bloc from the North and a three member black voting bloc from the South. On all important issues the North bloc votes against the three black members and the community. The stalemate in I.S. 142 where black parents have concluded that the local board cannot respond to their needs has resulted in the demand that Chancellor Harvey Scribner put the school under trusteeship. This incident fully dramatizes the folly of the Board of Education in ignoring the local community when the district lines were drawn.

The bill's stipulation that no district may have less than 20,000 pupils in average daily attendance had three important consequences: the destruction of the demonstration districts, the impossibility for blacks and Puerto Ricans to develop voting majorities and the easy capture of the school boards by organized groups.

Nominations

In order to be nominated as a candidate petitions had to be filed complying with

the election law. A candidate was required to file an official petition by January 18, 1970. Furthermore, petitions for the elections, in keeping with the stipulations of the decentralization bill, were not circulated until late December, 1969.

The political apathy and absence of civic virtue of underprivileged citizens is almost an article of faith believed in by many social scientists. Since the focal point of the decentralization bill was increased community awareness and participation in the development of educational policy by the "alienated", the proposed electoral mechanism developed should be such as to ensure that the new local school boards are representative of the community and its desires. Even the preamble of the law calling for a submission of a decentralization plan "finds and declares" that "*increased community awareness and participation* in the educational process is essential to the furtherance of educational innovation and excellence in the public school system within the city of New York."[9]

The salient fact that must be re-emphasized is that all mechanisms relating to the election of the local school boards should be oriented to decreasing the apathy, disenchantment and frustration of the grass roots elements. The numerous requirements of the section of the bill dealing wth the nomination procedure—petitioning, qualifications of petitioner, the meeting of the short deadline in a first and unique election, the right to be challenged and make challenges, the inexperience with legal terminology —all militated heavily against unorganized grass roots people. For example, although there is nothing inherently illegal, immoral or difficult in the petition procedure, it could have been dispensed with. In substitution, a longer campaigning period could have been instituted during which announced candidates would debate the issues and get themselves known, while the districts' electorate would have had more time to acquaint themselves with both the candidates' views and the complicated election procedure.

Instead of encouraging greater numbers of community people to participate as candidates, the petition procedure was seen as an unnecessary impediment. One black resident of District 17 told me "The Man always wants to know how many people you've got behind you before he legitimizes you." In short, if I interpret him correctly, he espouses a conviction of ghetto dwellers that all actions of the political process are meant to dissemble.

This is not to say that there should be no guidelines or qualifications as to who can run for an elected office. Certainly, there must be some sort of consideration given to age and residency and so on, but the stipulation in the bill which called for the circulation of petitions, the collecting of signatures, the determination of challenges and the filing of these petitions within the end of December, 1969 and January 18, 1970 was unconscionable. This stipulation created unnecessary hardships upon that section of the citizenry already burdened by many politico-socio-economic liabilities. "What is perplexing us", says Blanche Lewis, President of the United Parents Association, "and we can't say anything illegal is going on, is that instead of bringing parents closer to the schools as they are supposed to, we fear that the elections are making parents more alienated and disenfranchised."[10]

The theme of alienation and disenfranchisement of grass roots people became a popular cry as the date of the election drew closer. So great was the pressure brought to bear on the Board of Education that eventually it rescheduled the election.

Rescheduling

The first date set for the elections was January 27, 1970. Arguing that the time

allotted to candidates and to the public was too short (for neither could the one make known their views nor could the other acquaint themselves with the new election procedure), Corinne Willing, Director of the now defunct Coalition for an Effective Community School System, protested to the Board of Education.

She sought suspension of the Community School Board elections and called for a public examination on the ground that "the procedures and practices of the elections are defeating the very purposes for which the elections are to be held."[11]

The Coalition listed 7 reasons in support of its protest, among them:

(1) The faulty structure of the law itself.

(2) The lack of (precise) information as to the nature and powers of the local school boards to be elected.

(3) The absolute rejection through boycott of segments of the community whose participation in the elections and subsequent support of the school boards are essential if the change over is to bring stability instead of further confrontation.

(4) The lack of public information channels within the districts to give all candidates access to the public. This last reason was of crucial importance because there were 1,051 candidates vying for the 279 seats city-wide. This meant an average of 34 candidates per district, ranging from as few as 11 in District 12 (Bronx) to as many as 80 in District 31 (Richmond).

The Board of Education promised to review the entire situation to see whether a valid election could be held at a later date.

By rescheduling the elections from January 27, 1970 to March 19, 1970, the Board of Education acknowledged the reasonableness of the Coalition's protest that the election procedures were defeating the very purposes for which the elections were to be held.

Registration and Voting

The law stipulated that any registered voter who lives in the district and any parent who is a citizen of New York State, a resident of New York City for 90 days and is at least 21 years of age, can vote. It further stated that no one may vote in more than one district and that there will be a special registration period for the first election.

Indeed the registration procedure is a most important element of the selection process. Without it, it would be impossible to check the eligibility of all those who present themselves as voters, especially with respect to their residency qualifications.

When all factors are considered, however, the bill's stipulation providing open eligibility to all residents of the district plus its age and residency requirements were counterproductive to the goal of assimilating parents of the community in the decision-making process of educational policy.

Open Eligibility

The registration drive produced only minimal results. There were more newly regular registered voters than parents in every borough, except Manhattan, where 3,499 new regular voters registered as opposed to 3,769 parents specially registering for the school board elections. Thus, the first tally city-wide was 40,461, with 25,426 newly registered voters and 15,035 specially-registered parents. The other figures were: Bronx—

5,527 regular, 3,632 parents; Brooklyn—8,692 regular, 5,214 parents; Queens—6,423 regular, 2,340 parents; and Richmond—1,285 regular, 80 parents. (Appendix III)

These rewards were small when compared to the cost of one million dollars to the city. Despite the two-week extension and widespread television coverage, ghetto parents did not vote. A United Bronx Parents *Newsletter* quoted Senator Basil Patterson as saying that "parents just don't believe that their votes could mean anything in this whole confusing scheme and the triple procedures of nominating, registering and voting would prove unnecessarily difficult to ghetto residents"[12] Probably, that is why the Massachusetts decentralization bill does not call for pre-election registration. The reasoning here is that the desire to encourage voting percentages of low-income residents must be accompanied by simplified election procedures.

For the non-English speaking parents, the registration problems were further compounded. Polling places in those districts had no assurance of providing assistance to non-literate parents. Puerto Rican leaders in the Bronx criticized voter registration because parents in poor communities were completely disenfranchised by the confusing, complicated and irrelevant registration procedures. Ocean Hill-Brownsville had to go to court to win guarantees that at least one Spanish-speaking registrar would be available in each registration place in Puerto Rican neighborhoods.

Mrs. Evelina Antonetty, Executive Director of United Bronx Parents, and Mr. Ramon Velez, Executive Director of the Huntspoint Multi-Service Center, detailed some incidents which may account for the low registration among Puerto Rican parents. Of the 45 elementary schools in South Bronx, Huntspoint, Morrisania and East Tremont area, parents of 38 schools were not permitted to register if they had not attended the sixth grade. In five schools they were told to take the literacy test at the Board of Education headquarters. In 13 schools parents were told that they must first become American citizens. In 2 schools Cuban parents were told to report to the immigration authorities.

Age and Residency

The necessity that natural parents, foster parents or guardians be 21 years of age and over and that he or she be living in New York City for at least ninety days limited the participation of many minority people as voters and potential candidates. The resident qualification discriminated against many Southerners, Puerto Ricans and West Indians, who had migrated or moved to the district within 90 days of the elections.

The age stipulation could have been flexible enough to include all parents 15 years and over, or for that matter all parents. To do otherwise would be to disregard a fundamental happenstance of ghetto existence. A high proportion of black and Puerto Rican adolescents become parents due to pregnancies, unmitigated by the use of contraceptive devices and the inaccessibility to abortions. It would be folly to argue that the inadequate delivery of educational services are not of interest to these adolescent unmarried parents, but yet the law disqualified them from ever having a voice in school policy, either as voters or candidates.

Under the Bundy Plan, these parents would have had an input either as one of the six parent-representatives on the local school board, or as a member of the district-wide panel or as a representative of the individual school his child attends. There is an added bonus here for such a parent—the only qualification for voting at any level is that he is a parent. The Bundy Plan proposed that even "payment of dues (as a member of his PA or PTA) should not be a requirement for voting."[13]

Local School Boards

The local school boards would have little meaning unless they are vehicles for the exercise of power by the community. The more autonomy they have, the more easily these local institutions will be able to respond to local conditions and needs. As Bundy states: ". . . the schools themselves, as true local institutions, should gain influence over the shape and sense of community" in the individual school districts of the city.[14]

Secondly, where there is no outright grant of powers or where such grants are limited by conditions, the influence of these boards are curtailed. "With the exception of powers reserved to the central education agency, the Community School Board districts should have all the powers necessary to operate public schools effectively."[15]

Jurisdiction

As of July 1, 1970, each community board obtained jurisdiction over public schools and programs in its district from the pre-kindergarten through junior high school level. This jurisdiction includes all school and school-connected programs, except for certain programs over which jurisdiction is reserved to the Chancellor. Such programs include special education services which are utilized by a substantial number of persons from more than one community district, for example, the handicapped.

Regarding the programs under the jurisdiction of the local school boards, Article 52-A provides that the boards "shall have all the powers and duties previously possessed by the city board, and the powers and duties . . . delegated to local school boards under the Marchi Act of February 16, 1970."[16] Not all of these powers are specifically listed, however. The powers not specifically listed are granted only insofar as they are "not inconsistent with the provisions of this article (52-A) and the policies established by the City Board."[17]

The ambiguous language of the law suggests that the similar grants of power to the city board are meant to give the city central board a final veto over any local school board actions if the city board chose to exercise it. Elsewhere Article 52-A gives the city board "except as otherwise provided", responsibility to "determine all policies of the city district."[18] This general grant is followed by a statement of specific community board powers and duties.

Powers of Local School Boards

The specific powers granted to the local school boards may reveal something concerning the potentiality of these boards to effect meaningful changes in the public educational system of New York City and this may, in turn, explain some of the apathy evidenced in the election. The law set forth the powers and duties and express limitations in the following areas: Curriculum, Textbooks, and Evaluation; Teaching and Supervisory Personnel; Expense Budget and Fiscal Management; Planning and Construction of Capital Projects; Maintenance and Repair; Parent Participation.

Curriculum, Textbooks and Evaluation

The community boards were empowered to determine matters relating to instruction of students and the selection of textbooks and other instructional materials, subject to the approval of the Chancellor. This condition severely limits the ability of the local school boards to affect the content and style of the children's education.

Minority parents, unlike many social scientists, blame the schools and the teachers for their children not learning and reject the thesis that the reason is to be found in

the cultural heritage and background of the students. They argue that the curricula have not been adapted to suit the needs of the diverse groups now entering the public schools.

The concept of equal educational opportunity has come to mean more intensive dosages of standardized educational services. Since the standardization of educational services facilitates easier administration, the bureaucracy tends to reward those teachers and supervisory personnel who accept the standard procedures and norms, while punishing those who deviate. Thus, in a curious way, the administrators and bureaucrats of the education industry, through inflexible curriculum policies, perpetuate a vicious cycle of non-education upon those they are supposed to educate.

It should be pointed out that the demand for community influence on curriculum matters does not mean rejection of professionalism. There is no reason why the community cannot develop policy while the professionals implement those policies. As a matter of fact, in a school district where the parents, community, and educators work closely together a meaningful educational program can be worked out which reflects the aspirations of all the parties concerned.

Furthermore, the evaluation procedure of the decentralization bill where the community boards are required by law to submit annual reports on the educational effectiveness of the district's programs, was sufficient to produce the desired result.

Personnel: Teaching and Supervisory

The law provided for two hiring and assignment processes: a basic method which applies uniformly to teaching and supervisory personnel and an alternate method which applies to teachers only, and which community boards may employ only under certain circumstances.

Hiring: Basic Method

All candidates hired will have to meet minimum education and experience requirements (not less than state certification requirements) established by the Chancellor. Every candidate, except those for the position of Chancellor, executive-deputy, deputy and assistant superintendent, must be examined and placed on eligible lists by the Board of Examiners.

The Board of Examiners is continued in substantially its present form, but for a few minor adjustments. Ranking is continued for the filling of teacher vacancies, but is abolished for supervisory positions. While the Chancellor may serve as a member, he can never be chosen as chairman under the new rotating chairmanship system. Furthermore, temporary assistants then employed at the exclusive discretion of the board to help in administering examinations will have to be nominated or approved by the Chancellor or community superintendents.

Appointment and Assignment

The bill stipulates that the Chancellor will appoint and assign from appropriate eligible lists all teachers for local school board districts.

Hiring: Alternate Method

This method may be used by community boards any time between October 1 and May 1 any year to obtain personnel for the following September for any school which is ranked in the bottom 45% of a city-wide reading test given annually by the Chancellor.

This method may also be used by a local school board at any time to fill a teaching

position when there are no names on an eligible list. However, this authority is subject to four conditions which must be met by the appointee—state certification requirements; attainment of a place on an eligibility list or passed an equivalent qualifying examination; passed the National Teachers Exam within the past four years at a pass mark required of teachers during the prior year in the five largest cities using the NTE as a qualification.

The granting of this alternate hiring method to local school boards is of questionable benefit to children with low reading scores. In the first place, only those schools which rank in the lowest 45% in the city would qualify although a large number of the city schools may very well fall within the lowest 45% of the national average. Secondly, this would rule out help for schools in transitional areas such as the West Side.

By granting the power to hire and assign the teaching personnel of the local school boards to the Chancellor, the decentralization bill greatly undermined the possibility of educational innovation.

The recruitment and selection of teachers should have been a shared activity between the Chancellor and or city board and the local school boards. Such a coordination could have saved time and money—the city board could handle the certification aspects while the local boards could be responsible for interviewing the applicant because it would be most sensitive to the teaching needs of the community.

The keeping of the Board of Examiners (though slightly modified) and ranked eligibility lists are antithetical to the flexible personnel policies of a proper-functioning school board. In many school districts it may be more desirable to hire a parent who is only a high school graduate, but is active in community affairs as a social science teacher than a college-trained teacher from outside the district. The analogies used by the parent-teacher to explain his material would be more easily grasped by the students, and, this would facilitate learning.

Another added advantage to the sharing of personnel responsibilities between the city board and the local school boards would be the minimization of dismissals and transfers.

Expense and Fiscal Management

Budget Request. The community boards are to hold public hearings and submit budget estimates for their activities to the Chancellor. After possible modifications and upon consultation with the respective community superintendents, the Chancellor then submits the consolidated city budget estimate to the Board of Estimate and the City Council.

Allocation

The Chancellor then allocates the funds to the local school boards in accordance with "objective formulas" established annually by the city board in consultation with the mayor and the community boards. The formula will take account of the relative educational need to the maximum feasible extent.

Special allocations from appropriate city board funds may also be made to local school boards for special needs or innovative programs.

The personnel and curriculum policies of the bill make it difficult for innovative programs to arise. Local school districts which request funds for programs created outside the standardized curriculum or providing the use of unranked, unlisted teachers

certainly would not be funded. For it is to protect against these contingencies that fiscal management remained centrally.

To develop fiscal autonomy and flexibility to shape its budget to match programs, and to avoid disproportionate disbursement, the Bundy plan of strict per pupil allocation seems appropriate.

Planning and Construction of Capital Projects

The decentralization law charged the city board, through the Chancellor, for substituting a capital budget for construction, remodeling and enlargement of all school system facilities to the City Planning Commission. The powers of the local school boards in this area are limited to the submission of proposals to either the Chancellor, Mayor, Board of Estimate, City Council and Planning Commission.

In construction, the city board retains the responsibility to employ all personnel required for construction and design. However, the law gives the local school boards only advisory powers in connection with site selection, design and construction of facilities which will be under their jurisdiction.

Although it is reasonable that construction should be handled centrally, the city board could have enlarged upon the powers given to the local school boards. For instance, the local school boards could have been empowered to supply non-professional personnel when any construction is being undertaken in any individual district.

Maintenance and Repairs

The city board maintains jurisdiction over plant operation and maintenance. This jurisdiction would continue the low level of employment for minority groups in non-professional positions. As a matter of fact, many residents and their sympathizers argued that the labor union's overwhelming support of the UFT in the Ocean Hill confrontation was predicated on the fear that real community control would phase out white non-professional workers in construction and custodial services.

The Division of Plant Operation, Maintenance and Office of Design and Construction spends over 110 million dollars annually from the expense budget. The Plant Operations (custodial services) has usually amounted to about 50 million dollars of this. The law stipulates that each of the 31 districts should get an annual disbursement of a quarter of a million dollars for repairs. But since this amounts to only about 8 million dollars or about 6.3% of the total expenditure, and since the city requires performance bonds on all jobs over $2500, this means that most black and Puerto Rican contractors, many of whom are unable to get insured, will be unable to post bonds, and thus would be disqualified from bidding. Furthermore, even if they should succeed in getting bonded, most of these local outfits cannot take the job because they wouldn't be able to wait that long for the city's tardy paycheck.

In effect, the decentralization bill gives local communities control only over the headaches and problems—but does not give any real autonomy, flexibility, responsibility or power. To give communities control over running the cafeteria for students and teachers, to maintain discipline and to run after-school centers can hardly be considered much of a local benefit. As one community resident phrased it, "Such a grant is another manifestation of the long-held stereotype where blacks are seen as 'Supramasculine menials or Amazons'."

Conclusion

Under the present set up where power over staff, curriculum standards and budget remains at headquarters local school boards will be unable to effect any meaningful change in the system. A recent Newsletter of the United Bronx Parents puts it this way, "The schools are dirty and unhealthy—but the power over custodians remains at headquarters. The schools are overcrowded—but the power over construction remains at headquarters. Books are not delivered—but the power over purchasing remains at headquarters. To improve our schools, parents must be able to hire teachers and supervisors who will teach their children successfully. Parents must be able to fire those persons who do not perform satisfactorily. This they cannot do as long as central headquarters contracts with the UFT and CSA—contracts which tie the hands of board members for the duration of their term of office."[19]

PART II: *The Election*

Proportional Representation

The law stipulated that community boards would be elected by proportional representation. The avowed aim of this election procedure was to avail small groups in every district the chance of being represented roughly in proportion to their voting strength in the district, provided that they nominate a reasonable number of candidates and obtain the vote of their supporters. Proportional representation is an elective system in which each voter has only one vote in a multiple election. In the local school board elections each voter voted for from 1 to 9 candidates marking the names on his ballot in order of preference. The ballots were long, rectangular sheets of paper on which were printed, in rotating alphabetical order, the names of all the candidates running in that individual district. The rotating alphabetical measure was introduced as a safeguard against any one candidate benefitting disproportionately from the consistent first place position of his name.

Winners were determined by a quota system, and any candidate who reached the quota was to be declared a winner. A quota was figured by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of local school board seats plus one, and then adding one to the answer. For example, District 18 in Brooklyn, had 9 seats on the board (the same number as on all the other 30 boards). In this district the number of valid votes cast was 12,014. The computation for the quota was as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Valid Votes}}{9+1} + 1 = \text{Quota} \quad \frac{12{,}014}{(9+1)} + 1 = 1{,}202$$

A quota can be reached in either of two ways—directly on the first count or indirectly by transfer votes. In District 18 there weren't any winners on the first count, which meant that on the first count no candidate received 1202 votes. However, the first five persons to be elected on this board reached quota by the transfer method. They were elected on the 22nd, 25th, 30th, 32nd and 33rd counts respectively. The other four members of the board were elected without reaching the quota because they received the highest votes of all the other candidates. They received 1169, 1168, 1090 and 945 votes respectively.

PR was used in Britain and many other European countries as an elective process for very many years. Today it is still being used in Ireland and Israel. In this country it was used in Chicago, and a few other cities but it eventually yielded to plurality elections. Cincinnati and Massachusetts still use this system, though modified and adjusted for the election of local school boards. The last time PR was used in New York City was in the 1930's, but was discontinued when it facilitated the election of Benjamin Davis, an avowed old-line communist to the city council.

Paul Greenberg, executive director of the 1970 PRCC (Proportional Representation Campaign Committee) accounts for the re-emergence of proportional representation in terms of a pendulum concept. He theorized that at certain historical periods the mechanism of plurality elections breaks down and thought that the factious violence permeating the New York City public school system results from the process of selecting local school boards which excludes a sizeable local minority. For him, "proportional representation is a response to the existing weaknesses inherent in the present political system . . . for, in a pluralist society political consensus and peaceful settlement of disputes can only be secured through representative assemblies."[20]

For proportional representation enthusiasts, a truly representative assembly is one which reflects, with more or less mathematical accuracy, the various divisions in the electorate. This belief that only under proportional representation can minority opinions be included, while contemporaneously restricting the influence of political clubs and other sectarian interests, is but a mere fiction. It underscores a rather naive portrayal of the impact of PR on the outcome of the school board elections, especially in terms of the unrepresentative nature of the boards (Appendix I) and the domination of the elections by parochial and sectarian interests.

That proportional representation minimizes political conflict by its ability to include minority opinions forces the proportionalists to focus solely upon the composition of the assembly, believing all the while that the assembly's proportionate composition is sufficient to produce the necessary reform-oriented programs. Contrary to their thinking, however, it does not follow that because the boards are of a proportionate ethnic mix (a hope that did not materialize in the elections for the PR advocates) that representativeness is guaranteed through cooperation. Rather than breed amity and consensus, the political scientist Hannah Pitkin reasons that:

> Proportional representation atomizes opinion, multiplies political groupings, increases the violence of factions, prevents the formation of a stable majority, and prevents the legislature from governing which is its major task.[21]

Pitkin's argument is given full weight by the present situation in Ocean Hill. In this district there is a move by black residents to replace the current black board charging that it is not representative.

Another refutation to the claim by PR that it alone can guarantee the inclusion of minority opinions and or groups is evidenced by the election results: of a total minority school population city-wide of 65%, only 27.4% (78) minority residents are now serving as members on these local school boards.[22] The third factor which delimited minority representation and which has not been satisfactorily explained by the PR advocates is the boycotts.

The PR enthusiasts, when confronted with this aspect of the elections, are quick to reply that since voting was a precondition to election, those who did not vote, they claim, cannot expect representation. Yet one must consider factors that frustrated community residents: the Board of Elections' abdication of its powers, the complex PR procedure (voting, counting, supervising) and the liabilities of the socio-political system which incapacitates grass roots people in all their political struggles.

Abdication of the Board of Elections

The decentralization law empowered the Board of Elections to manage and supervise registration, nomination procedures, election procedures and counting. The interim board was to provide for the first registration of voters that was originally set for the period January 2 through 16, 1970.

How well did the boards do their jobs? The electoral mechanism for this election was a first for many residents. The very uniqueness of the PR procedure would seem to suggest that the Board of Elections would assume the responsibility of explaining the new procedure to community residents.

But it was the manifest "lack of public information channels within districts" that impelled Mrs. Willing of the Coalition for an Effective Community School System to protest to the Board of Elections that the purposes of decentralization were being

subverted.[20] Although the board rescheduled the elections from January 27 to March 19, 1970, acknowledging the validity of the Coalition's protest, it did not see it fit to implement the reasoned plea of the Public Education Association's David Seeley.

Mr. Seeley had called upon the board to appoint a high level, special personnel group to help it work out new policies which would facilitate the implementation of the law imposed upon them to administer by the state legislature. Such a commission, had it existed would have received the many complaints from the community and recommended remedial action; it would have devised effective procedures within the framework of the law to give voters the necessary information which would enable them to make intelligent choices among the 1000 or so candidates running district-wide.[20] (The average number of candidates per district was about 70)

This inconsistency and vacillation on the part of the Board of Education created an information vacuum. The PREP organization *(Proportional Representation Educational Project)*, headed by Sylvia Deutsch, was instrumental with its film documentary and speakers bureau in educating a significant number of community residents in winding their way through the intricacies of casting their ballots under PR. But the real beneficiaries of the board's abdication of its powers however, proved to be the parochial and sectarian forces organized and arrayed against community control. Sylvia Deutsch indicated that most of the requests for PREP's services came from groups, who, in her estimation were comparatively well organized—parent associations and church groups from white, middle-class districts. She commiserated at the paucity of requests which came from predominantly black or Puerto Rican districts—districts whom she thought needed those services most.

Complexities of PR

The Election Fraud Bureau trained attorneys and laymen as "special assistants" and "special investigators" respectively to man the 5,000 or more polling places that were used in the school board elections. The functions of the special assistants and investigators at the polling places were to eliminate electioneering at the polls, keep alert to possible election frauds, give layman's advice to voters, and call the Elections Fraud Bureau or Board of Elections when questions arose that needed official determination or action.

There was great difficulty at the polls in carrying out these objectives. In the first place, Morton Getman, Executive Assistant to Attorney General, Louis Lefkowitz, told the Coalition that whereas in regular elections 1200 to 1500 such assistants and investigators were necessary, it needed three to four times that many for the March 19, 1970 school board elections. Yet he lamented his inability to recruit the needed number because "we can't get enough interest in this election."[21]

Understaffing in this critical area created a spate of irregularities on election day; electioneering was rampant; there were reports of voters in many depressed communities being accompanied into the polling booth by canvassers. Furthermore, many of the designated poll watchers did not fully understand what to look for because even when they observed irregularities, such as missing buff cards etc., they did not know how to deal with them.

As soon as the polls closed, the law stipulated that the ballot boxes be sealed and taken to one central counting place within the school district. This provision enables the Board of Elections personnel and the candidates' watchers to double check the ballots against the records from the polling places and the validity of the ballots are ascertained.

In the count, the tally clerks should first check the ballot box to see that it is sealed. He then copies the total number of votes appearing on a green slip attached to the box. Then he opens the box and subtracts the invalid votes from the total on the green slip and uses the answer as a subtotal for determining the quota. The first choices on each ballot for each polling station as drawn by lot are counted.

After the first choices are counted, with the ballots kept in the order in which they have been counted, the last ballots counted above quota for any candidate are considered surplus. From that point each ballot is examined to determine the voters' alternate choices. In other words, since each ballot counts for only one person, if a voter's first choice has already been elected before his vote is counted, this vote goes toward the tally of the voter's second choice, and so on.

When there are no longer any surplus votes of this sort, the candidate with the smallest number of votes is declared eliminated and his votes are redistributed among the other running candidates with the desired quota for election, or the field has been narrowed down to nine candidates with the highest counts. In this way it becomes possible to elect several candidates who have not attained quota. Appendix V shows that of the 279 members elected to the boards only 17% (48) were elected on the first ballot; 59% (164) reached quota by means of transfer ballot.

In an interview with a counting supervisor in Queens, she painted a picture of near chaos and confusion. She claimed that the director in charge of the counting for that district was not sufficiently acquainted with his duties. Nor did he seem to have understood the specific instructions of the counting procedure outlined in a memorandum by Dr. George Hallett, director of the "special unit" on the elections. Not knowing what to do, he became so confused that on election night he instructed all the workers to sharpen pencils and go home. On the night after the elections, the assistant to the director took an hour to figure out how to use the workers at his disposal. He finally resolved the matter by allowing each supervisor to pick his own tally clerks.

"At one point", she stated, "the assistant to the director had a bunch of loose stubs in his hand which he had found in a discarded box; at another time, halfway through the counting of first ballot votes from one polling station, the assistant director remembered that the number of valid votes and the quota must be determined before countings begins."[25] A widespread occurrence of this type of irregularity could account for the the three people in this district who were elected to the school board without reaching the quota of 2490. City-wide there were 66 members (24%) who were elected to the boards without reaching the quota.[26]

Another complaint was that four boxes from a polling station in AD 27 came opened. She reported the incident to the director and the accountants, but nothing was done about it. Missorts were abundant because many of the clerks who were checking and stamping the ballots did not keep them in the order as drawn by lots. The order in which the polling station of a district was counted was determined by lot. This determination by lot by which the ballot boxes were to be opened evoked bitter criticism from many quarters. Some 12 parents brought such in February 1970 *(Campbell et al vs. Board of Education)* to enjoin the elections from taking place on the ground that there was a "substantial element of chance" in the counting scheme in this particular aspect of the proportional representation mechanism. Expert witnesses showed in an example involving 6 candidates for 3 seats in 30 polling places that this scheme could variously elect any of several candidates to the third seat—depending on the chance

order in which the ballots of the polling places were counted. The judge ruled in favor of the Board of Education, claiming that the evidence presented was too theoretical.

Democratic Theory and Proportional Representation

Most American political scientists, fall victim to misconceptions rooted in the concept of a liberal pluralist notion; that out of the class of special interest groups emerges freedom and the common interest. Thus, for Joseph Schumpeter, "democracy results from a competitive struggle for people's votes"[27]; for Robert Dahl, it is competition among interest groups and the power to preempt private wishes from becoming political issues; for Edward Banfield, community decision-makers "operate on the principle that everyone should get something and no one should be hurt very much"[28].

The conceptual thrust of proportional representation is akin to the pluralist notion. The emphasis of the proportionalists upon accurate mathematical reflection of group opinions on the local school boards as a precondition to representation is that from the debate among this microcosm, the local school board—the will of the community would be served.

The arguments of both the proportionalists and the pluralists are inadequate. Paradoxically, an inevitable admission must be made: isomorphic representation is impossible in a modern, industrialized society like America, but at the same time Pitkin's questioning of the attainment of the perfectly condensed replica, sought by PR, must be confronted. She says:

> If one could produce a perfect replica . . . in every respect . . . then no one could reasonably object to substituting the replica for the original. But, if the perfect replica is an ideal that can never be achieved . . . then there is a problem . . . As soon as the correspondence is less than perfect, we must begin to question what sort of features and characteristics are relevant to action, and how good the correspondence is with regard to just those features.[29]

In effect, this contention by Pitkin undermines Mr. Greenberg's argument that "PR guarantees the election of minorities and goes beyond the right to vote to the right of representation."[30] In other words, Pitkin's demurer raises the necessity of determining the criteria for representation—people or opinions. Imputing theoretical consistency to the PR advocates, they must have sought the "representation of all the differing opinions in the community as represented by different groups."[31] Yet in practice, their criteria of determination was based not on groups with differing opinions but on aggregates of 200/300 community residents, disregarding the fact that many groups could be and was formed from a larger homogeneous group sharing the same opinion. The result was the atomization of opinion and a contest of wills between fragmented white and black groups.

Again, if the representation of opinions were the goal of the PR advocates, should not the election mechanism be such as to facilitate the election of persons who reflect every shade of opinion within the districts? Or did the sponsors of proportional representation know, *a priori,* that there were only two different shades of opinions: one held by whites and the other by non-whites. The overriding, though implicit, goal behind PR, was the inclusion of blacks on the school boards; the thinking being that the majority of white residents and parents were understandably against community control and having the greater voter registration, blacks would have no chance in a direct election.

There is one final hurdle to be overcome by the proportionalists. Even if the impossible ideal of all opinions were to be reflected in the composition of the local school boards, how must these opinions be represented? What would be the opinion of the local school board member while representing his district? Does the represented district always have an articulated opinion on every issue? Or does it mean that when there is no such articulated opinion, no representation can take place?

This question, as raised by Pitkin, embroils us in the controversy. Could representatives be said to represent when they reflect the views of their constituents, even cases when the constituent's views are inimical to their own best interests? Or are the representatives representing when they press for local parochial interests at the expense of broader interests, even if these broader interests, would, in the long run, be advantageous to the represented? That is to say, under proportional representation are white, church-elected candidates who ran on a platform calling for the repeal of the Blaine Amendment, representing their constituents' interests, when they, in fact, press for its repeal? Or is the corollary true: Is the decision not to press for the repeal representing one's constituency?

Thus PR, with its accurate reflection thesis, does not provide an operational criteria by which the represented can guarantee that his representation would act in his interest. In short, the ultimate question to be answered is—How can the represented control his representative who must be both independent and responsive? Proportional representation offers no answers.

Representativeness is accountability of the representatives to the represented, not before or after, but during his term of office. Hannah Pitkin distinguishes between two formalistic views: one view defines a representative as someone who has been elected (authorized) the other defines him as someone who will be subject to election (held to account). The way to guarantee this type of representativeness is to create selection mechanisms such that the people who stand to lose most from the continuation of that which is in need of change would be elected.

Any other mechanism would open the flood gates to political opportunists, professional politicians, and to those who by virtue of their education and political experience would be victorious under any election. That is why the Bundy Plan proposing a dual election procedure:—indirect elections of 6 parent members and nomination of 5 members city-wide—is so attractive.

In *The End of Liberalism* political scientist Theodore Lowi criticizes the pluralist theory for its inability to create workable policies. For example, he concludes that the failure of the federally-sponsored urban renewal and Federal Housing Administration programs was due to the presence of vested interest groups. That there were vested interest groups there could be no doubt and on this score he is partially correct, but his refusal to delineate how the successful groups did it detracted from the validity of his argument. To account for the failure of these programs Lowi and the pluralists must first distinguish between the participants in the power struggles, noting their resources—financial, organizational and past performances. It is this inability to make these distinctions that prevented Robert Dahl from predicting the breakdown in law and order in the ghettos of New Haven so soon after the publication of his book, *Who Governs?*

White American pluralism seems to work. But when this pluralism is attempted so as to bring blacks and other minorities into the bargaining process, factious

violence ensues; the program is shelved and its failure attributed either to the lack of political sophistication and awareness of blacks or the theoretical conclusion is drawn that pluralism, per se, is an impractical ideal. This latter conclusion is the one arrived at by Lowi. Local school boards and decentralization of certain services is almost a way of life for many suburban communities. But when the demonstration districts in New York City tried it, chaos resulted, and it was shelved as unworkable. But the decentralization bill which came in its wake produced unrepresentative local school boards with no potentiality for upgrading the inadequate educational services now dispensed to one million children.

Unlike Lowi, political scientist Michael Parenti, in a process-oriented research investigated two attempts at organization for change by grassroots people in Newark, New Jersey, from 1967-1969. He found Professor Harold Lasswell's notion of "politics of prevention" operative. The people's attempt to remedy their housing conditions and install a traffic light at a busy intersection where many children and other pedestrians were run over by motor vehicles followed a vicious cycle of defeat. The familiar pattern was of an elaborate investigation, rigorous and time consuming legalistic procedures, the ritualistic appearance of a public figure, disingenuous promises of solution, admonition for restraint and patience and, finally, police harassment of active persons.

The above portrayal would seem to account for the political quiescence of the underprivileged in terms of:

(1) the limitation on the time and energy of the poor
(2) the limitation of physical or psychic energy to engage politically
(3) lack of confidence
(4) fear: harassment, eviction, prosecution, police assault and the ubiquitous fear of powers that be to prevent participation.

From this, Parenti concludes that "lower class non-participation results not from a lack of civic virtue, but from defeatism and withdrawal fostered by liabilities within the political system of a kind not usually accounted for in the pluralist theory."[38]

In other words, Parenti saw a plurality of interests and actors represented by public officials, landlords, realty investors, the mayor, the police, the city council, political machines and the courts. This aggregation of interests revealed a remarkable capacity to move in the same direction against some rather modest lower class aims.

In this sense the failure of Community Action Programs is a function of the unwillingness of white America to make more than token allocations to blacks. This unwillingness serves two functions: first, it operates as a device for precluding more costly demands upon the system in the future; second, the effectiveness of these protest organizations is destroyed because they have an inevitable need to attract and maintain their following through successes. Thus, it would seem to follow that the major flaw in Lowi's thesis lies in his failure to examine the nature of Community Action Programs or community control in terms of the societal milieu and political processes at work with the participants.

The problems in American society are not due to the inability to concretize the "utopian" theory of pluralism—the position implied by Lowi—but to a governmental structure which precludes the possibility of entry into the political system of a sizeable minority of its citizens.

Liabilities of the LSB Elections

Bundy, in proposing the dual election procedure, emphasized the necessity of designing a selection procedure which excluded the "danger of domination by political clubs, the expense to candidates of campaigning, . . . and the possible domination of school affairs by majorities of residents who were not parents or by sectarian interests that might not hold the interests of public education uppermost."[33]

In terms of what actually happened in the process of the school board elections, all three of Bundy's fears came to pass.

Domination by Political Clubs

At a workshop on the "Local School Board Elections" held on June 29, 1970 at the Institute for Community Studies, with almost half the districts represented, three general conclusions were arrived at:

(1) that organized groups such as the Catholic Church and UFT had enormous successes because of their disciplined and effective vote.

(2) that the UFT could more easily defeat a candidate than put their slate over. This event further helped the Catholic Church.

(3) that many candidates, including most of the independents that won, enjoyed high pre-election exposure and reputations.

Of the 1051 candidates who ran for local school board seats 64.9% ran on slates; a slate is defined as a number of individuals or organizations which came together with the specific purpose of sponsoring or approving candidates.

Slates were of three kinds: those initiated by the candidates themselves; those created by interested groups of community parents and residents and those which were on-going organizations that sponsored the candidacies of individuals who shared similar political sentiments. This typology of slates should not mislead one into thinking that it was easy to isolate the "pro" or "anti" sentiments for community control. The real typology sought was that which would distinguish between these two sentiments based on which groups were originated or backed by the UFT, CSA or parochial interests on the one hand, and those which were originated or backed by community people bent on seeing community control succeed. This task presented many a difficulty and it may even account for the lowered percentages (64.9%) we were able to determine of the slate-backed candidates who ran city-wide.

For example, it was easy to establish that a "District Presidents Council" slate comprised candidates screened and endorsed by the parent or parent teacher associations of the districts' public schools. It was also easy to know that the "Coalition of Candidates for Better Schools" in District 13 represented a cooperative effort initiated by a group of candidates themselves. What was less easy to learn was that the "Parents concerned for a Better Public Education" of District 13 represented the parochial school interests or that the "Independent Citizens Committee" of District 25 was a front for the UFT, CSA and regular Democratic Club.

The Creation of Slates

The decentralization bill, substantively and procedurally, was the most important factor in the creation of slates.

Substantively, the decentralization law stipulated that "no candidate shall be identified by political party or other organizational affiliation on the nominating petitions."[34] This stipulation, inserted presumably to prevent manifest political overtures, was

counterproductive. Rather than minimizing political influence, it created a proliferation of slates which used devious methods—palm cards, the pulpit, computers and public school children—to get their message across.

The success of PR many years ago in New York City by minority groups was due, in part, to the identification of minority groups by party affiliation on the ballot, during the campaign, the views and ideological orientation of each party were necessarily promulgated and issues were raised and debated. Consequently with party identification on the ballot it was easy for the voter to make intelligent choices among the candidates.

Yet, despite the fact that the demand for the use of PR in the local school board elections was based on the obvious success of PR then, the Albany legislators thought it fit to insert this stipulation.

Procedurally, the long roster of candidates, the campaign and the method for the determination of winners all contributed to the creation of slates.

Roster of Candidates

The roster of candidates in almost every district was unusually long, averaging 35 per district, with as many as 55 in District 11 (Bronx); 67 in District 22 (Brooklyn); 47 in District 25 (Queens); 43 in District 2 (Manhattan); and 80 in District 31 (Richmond).[26]

Given the number of candidates running in every district and the novelty and heat over the concept of community control, one would expect a period of long campaigning to provide adequate voter information. These expectations did not ever materialize.

Campaign

The period for campaigning was very short, extending from late December, 1969 (when petitions began to be circulated) to January 18th (nine days before the first scheduled date of the elections—January 27, 1970). This short 4-week campaign period was possibly decided upon because of the general fear that "a long campaign period would exacerbate divisive feelings in the community."[27]

The rationale for the short campaign period proved inadequate. Almost immediately, as was already mentioned, the Coalition for an Effective Community School System demanded a suspension of the elections, arguing that the Board of Education should:

> "focus on the alienated and disaffected . . . and that the public should be rallied daily, issue by issue and item by item so that the elections will really be an expression of concern and involvement by parents and the community. . . . Anything less than this will betray those children whose education decentralization is meant to improve, the parents whose hopes will once again be dashed, and citizens of good will whose channel for effective participation will be broken."[28]

The Board of Education rescheduled the elections for March 19, 1970, but set no procedures in motion for educating the public as to the method and purposes of the election. By abdicating its responsibility to create an Elections Committee to act as a liaison between the communities and itself, the Board of Education facilitated the operations of city-wide interest groups (UFT, Catholic Church) in their drive to apprise their respective constituencies of *their interpretations of the purposes and methods of the local school board elections.*

25

These city-wide organizations capitalized on the default of both the Board of Education and Board of Elections to fragment and polarize sentiments relating to community control while organizing their vote through the creation of disciplined groups in every district.

Method for Determining Winners under PR

Since the method of becoming a winner under the procedures of proportional representation as proposed by the bill, is different to that under a system of plurality elections, campaign strategy must be planned with this difference in mind.

In a plurality election, a candidate needs only poll the greatest number of votes for himself to be declared the winner. Contrarily, in the school board elections, an individual candidate is competing for any one of nine positions on the board, and so he needs only to get a certain proportion of the votes cast—quota—in order to be elected.

Because campaign strategy is a function of the election procedure, proportional representation dictates only one potentially-successful strategy—that of slate formation. Because of the way proportional representation works, no candidate can afford to ignore the other candidates. This is the first contribution of PR to slate formation. Every vote is used only once. Hence, the way in which that vote is counted will depend upon three factors—the *relative* strength of the candidate voted for in relation to the others; the extent of the individual voter's interest in each of the candidates for which he voted (one voter's choice may be another voter's sixth, eighth or last choice), and the *effects* of the other voters' patterns in marking their ballots.

If a candidate were to ignore this aspect of PR and were to run a campaign where he asked voters to vote for him *only* and as their first choice, he would be courting two disastrous results. He would fail to be elected as a member of the board and would allow his voting constituency to cheat itself of the opportunity to place other people of their choice on the nine member board should he not reach quota. Of the 35.1% of all candidates who used this strategy, only 17% were victorious and this further proves the overall efficacy of slate formation because 82.6% of those candidates (64.9%) who ran on slates, were successful.[38] Furthermore, in every single case the winners enjoyed wide pre-election popularity.

It is, therefore, to the candidate's interests to decide in favor of working with other candidates. In such a way he has a greater chance of being elected because each candidate can encourage his respective constituency to vote for him as their first choice and for the other candidates as high alternative choices. This was the method used so successfully by the UFT and the Catholic Church, because it complements district-wide organization. Since each individual candidate needs a quota—10% of the total valid votes plus one—to be elected, it means that as few voters as five times the quota would guarantee any group control of the board.

There are two ways by which a majority can be won: first, voters amounting to the possible quota can be encouraged to mark five names with the same numbers; second, each 10% of the voters can be encouraged to indicate a different candidate as their first choice. Either of these options demands organizational and political sophistication beyond the ken of grassroots people.

In the same vein, the United Parents Association quoted in an article in the New York *Post*, voiced alarm at the number of special interest groups getting into the election. It singled out political clubs and large churches and saw the elections as

opened up to "political forces with financial backing and a technical knowledge of the whole electoral process that is far ahead of parents."[20]

Without exception, every district fielded slates of candidates for the elections. In every district also, there was evidence of the typology as already defined—UFT, Church and community based, though the extent and degree varied from district to district. (Appendix VIII) For instance in District 3 (Manhattan) there were 35 candidates. Although we could only account for 21 of the candidates spread among three slates—a Jewish-backed slate, a UFT slate and a community based slate, the slates received a 100% victory. No independent was elected.

In District 25 (Queens) there were four slates—the Independent Citizens Committee, Coalition of Concerned Citizens, North East Queens Ad Hoc Education Committee, and the Home School Association. The UFT and the Catholic church had several internal mailings sent to their members and parishioners advising them how to vote. This disciplined vote enabled the Church to do exceedingly well but although the UFT did not fare so well, the relentless pressure it brought to bear on William Schneyer, a community control advocate, substantiates the consensus of the ICS workshop that the UFT can more easily defeat a candidate than push its own slate. (Although 23 PA's of the 29 schools in the district interviewed all 47 candidates, the Independent Citizens Committee (UFT) at first refused him an interview, but reluctantly interviewed him afterwards.)

In District 31 (Richmond) there were 80 candidates out of 105 petitioners. There were three slates—Federation of PTA, a black slate comprised of black candidates and a Catholic slate. The Staten Island Advance supported 13 candidates from among the slates. Six of them won.

All of the slates were poorly organized. Even the UFT and the Catholic Church were not as organized as elsewhere in the city. Probably because the population was mostly Italian and Irish Catholics, there was no need for the Church to press forward because of a ready-made homogeneous constituency. The 24% (22,049) voter turnout (higher than in the Democratic gubernatorial primary, where 10,548 votes were cast) was the highest in the city. It elected a school board comprised of 5 Catholics, 1 Protestant, 2 Jews and 1 orthodox Catholic with no blacks or Puerto Ricans despite their 11% of the public school population.

The outcome of the elections clearly showed the influence church-oriented groups had on the election. Five candidates endorsed by the Federation of PTA's and not backed by the Conservative Party were elected.

This church vote was evident when the first of 4 priests in the race was declared defeated. More than 500 of these votes were transferred by the voters' choices to three other priests. When one of three nuns was defeated, the majority of her votes went to the priests and two Irish Catholic candidates. When a young conservative-backed candidate was ruled out more than half of his votes went to a conservative priest and the second largest bloc went to a candidate by Catholic groups, while most of the remaining votes switched back to a conservative.

What PR failed to do here was to elect a Negro to act as a spokesman for 10% of the Richmond population which is black and Puerto Rican. There were 4 black candidates. All of them defeated. This is paradoxical. Decentralization was supposed to grant a greater voice to minority groups in the operation of schools. One Negro then sat on the appointed board, but will be replaced by a new all white board.

In District 10 (Bronx) with a composite black and Puerto Rican pupil population of 43% only 1 non-white, a Puerto Rican, Mrs. Frances Rodriguez, was elected. The other eight were white. This district fielded one main slate—the Coalition for Better Schools (consisting of 30 Parent Associations and civic organizations.) The other candidates who won ran independently.

In District 18 (Brooklyn) of the 39 candidates who ran, 26 ran on slates, all the elected candidates were from that group, the 13 independent candidates went down to defeat. There were the CELB (Canarsie Educators for the Election of Local Boards), the Church slate (3 winners), the PTA, the UFT (4 winners), and the East Flatbush Civic Association.

The five districts above were chosen at random to give an indication of the pervasive use of slates in every Borough during the recent school board election. The success of these slates can be further demonstrated by comparing the voter turn-out of the local school board elections to that of the 1970 Democratic gubernatorial primary.

Queens

Six of the 7 districts in Queens are mainly of the Italian or Irish descent, and contrary to voting patterns in primaries 5 of these six Catholic-dominated districts polled a greater percentage of votes in the school board elections than in the Democratic gubernatorial primary. For example, in District 29 (AD 20) 9,266 people voted in the school board elections as opposed to 3,979 in the primary. Nor can it be said that the increase in voter turn-out was due to increased registration of parent voters, for in the Borough of Queens, as a whole, only 2,340 parent voters were registered still leaving 2,970 votes unaccounted for.

Brooklyn

Of the 10 local school board districts only District 22 (Jewish) and District 13 (black and Puerto Rican) are non-Catholic. In these districts, the differences between the LSB votes and the Democratic primary averaged about 5,000 votes. While there was only one Catholic district (#20) in which the LSB votes (20,362) was greater than the gubernatorial primary (8,938 votes), the average difference in votes in the other Catholic districts was only about 2,000 votes.

Manhattan

There were districts in Manhattan which reflected a greater turnout for the LSB elections than for the gubernatorial primary though the same pattern between Catholic and non-Catholic districts exists.

Richmond

In this district (#31) the local school board votes (22,029) outnumbered that of the gubernatorial primary (10,568) by 11,461 votes—an overwhelming figure. Again this shows the influence of the church with its ready-made constituency of an almost exclusive Italian and Irish Catholic majorities.

Bronx

Only in District 8 was there a preponderance of LSB votes, but the pattern in Manhattan and the Bronx could be fully evidenced. As a whole, however, the turn-out of the gubernatorial primary was greater than the LSB elections but even this slight margin (100,000 votes) does not militate against the efficacy of the church.

Impact of Slates on the Local School Board Elections

The greatest impact of the slates on the local school board elections was that it produced boards "dominated by majorities of residents who were not parents . . . and by sectarian interests who might not hold the interest of public education uppermost".[40]

Writing exactly one week after the elections Bernard Bard of the New York *Post* reflected the views of the Board of Education, parent groups and education organizations. He commented that "the concept of school decentralization as an instrument of educational reform had suffered a possibly irrevocable setback".[41] To him the serious blow of the elections arose from the "substantial victories to church-backed and conservative candidates . . . who may seek to impose . . . a traditionalist cast on the curriculum in their local districts or redirect sex and narcotics education programs . . . to their own philosophies".

The conservation of the local school boards, as expressed by the fear of the Bundy Panel and the New York *Post* article of March 25, 1970 were corroborated by the result of a survey conducted by the Public Education Association and the League of Women Voters which was carried in the New York *Times*. The *Times* correspondent reported that nearly three-fifths of the newly elected members were in favor of a subsidy for parochial schools, whereas 42% of all candidates agreed. This latter response is in accord with Msgr. Eugene J. Molloy's response to Long Island *Press* reporter, Mike Gershowitz, when asked whether he was looking for more than merely fringe benefits, the cleric replied, "Fringe benefits do not solve the basic problems."[42]

The New York *Times* article concerning respondents among the winners is in many respects consonant with questionnaires sent out by the Public Education Association before the elections. Analysis of the results in the five boroughs reveals that the local school boards with very few exceptions, is dominated by white conservatives who have little or no commitment to public education, let alone community control.

Questionnaires sent by the PEA with ten questions dealing with aid to parochial schools and narcotics were submitted to every candidate who filed petitions with the Board of Elections. The response was good. In several districts more than 70% of the candidates responded. City-wide, 67% of the candidates replied. The inventory enabled the candidates to make known their opinions on such major educational issues as powers of Community School Boards, staff selection, integration, federal aid to private and parochial schools and narcotics. On the issue of the need for educational improvement, 59% of the candidates indicated the need for major changes and improvements, yet only 39% of the candidates felt that, in selecting a community superintendent, they would choose a candidate excellent on sensitivity to the conditions and needs of the community, while fair on educational experience and ability. Forty-three percent preferred the candidate who possessed excellent educational experience and ability but whose sensitivity to the conditions and needs of the community was but fair.

This does not bode well for the output of the boards as they are presently constituted. Sixty-two percent of those who rated educational sensitivity first were from districts in which the UFT and Church slates won heavily, and the campaign literature and platform on which these candidates ran espoused the interests of parochial and private schools. Furthermore, their emphasis upon educational experience and ability in the choosing of a District Superintendent reflects a belief in the wisdom of the professional educator as opposed to the input of community parents. In other words, their emphasis seems to indicate that they have opted for a strategy of reform which is

one of long, incremental changes emanating from the top down (the professional bureaucracy) rather than from the bottom up—(maximum community participation).

On the major issue of aid to parochial and private schools only 48% of the candidates favored no aid at all or aid for fringe services only; 42% favored aid, either at the same level as for public schools or at a lower level. Again, this augurs badly for meaningful change within the present school system, because as evidenced by the figures 62% of the winners of the elections were candidates backed by the UFT, the Church and other organizations whose political sympathies lie with private and parochial school interests.

There is a great discrepancy in the collated percentages of the candidate's responses. While 59% of them agreed that the public schools are not meeting the educational needs of most children (and thereby in need of major changes and improvements) and whereas 42% as opposed to 48% favored aid, (either at the same level as for public schools or at a lower level) yet the LSB is composed of winners, 62% of which were backed by conservative slates.

The campaign literature of most of the church-backed members of the local school boards reflected an orientation for regressive and traditionalistic programs. The Thomas Dongan Council of #1251, Knights of Columbus in Bay Ridge (District 20) says it will give its backing only to candidates who promise "that there be a recitation of morning prayer to offer the day's accomplishments to God IN ALL SCHOOLS of District 20."[15] It also said that a repeal of the Blaine Amendment would put all schools, parochial as well as public, under the jurisdiction of the local school boards which is false.

District 20, it will be recalled, was one of the districts in Brooklyn which had a greater turnout in the LSB elections over the Democratic gubernatorial primary, and in which 9 whites won despite the presence of 21% black and Puerto Rican students in its public schools.

Another candidate of District 20, Dr. Horace Greeley pledged that if elected to the school board he would "unalterably . . . oppose in all ways sex education" as taught in schools because "such education must come from the home . . . not from some sly pornographer seeking to teach barnyard morality to your children."[16]

Some church-sponsored literature has also aroused the ire of many concerned citizens. The Church of St. Pancras in Glendale (District 24 in Queens) said in its bulletin that the new local school boards would be in a position to set taxes; this is false.

Comparison to Ocean Hill-Brownsville and Large City-Wide Boards

The demonstration districts (I.S. 201, Two Bridges, Ocean Hill-Brownsville) in terms of personnel, were composed mostly of community people who were non-professional and were inactive until the issue of decentralization became a burning one. The total significance of their output is dimmed by its historic proximity and by its untimely death. Yet beyond a doubt, it proved that community people are not "politically apathetic" as can be justified by the 25% turnout vote for the governing board elections. On the contrary, the personnel of the large city-wide boards before March 19, 1970 and the demonstration districts were highly professionalized with few women, blacks, Puerto Ricans and representatives from community parents or citizens.

It is the opinion of Professor Robert Lyke that there is a high positive correlation between moderate size of school boards, the categories of candidates recruited and the potential and tendency for change. He believes that because of the nature of the urban social system the concept of responsiveness is the same for large city-wide boards as for small local school boards, despite their obvious differences in background. Lyke characterizes the background of the large city-wide boards as national, commercial and middle class while the small community boards are local, industrial and lower class.[15] He faults the city-wide boards for its inability to create a "sense of community" among the parents of the children it serves while the small local school boards "cannot limit publicity" on some issues which are more efficiently settled in "private diplomacy" because of its large non-selective membership.

Taking Lyke's critique into consideration, the present school boards are more typical in personnel to the large city-wide boards than to the demonstration districts. This comparison seems to indicate that persons with a vested interest in the status quo (by reason of their inculcation of the prevailing protestant ethic—hard work equals achievement) would be unwilling to change it to facilitate the upward mobility of out groups.

Conclusions

Meaningful and representative local school boards were the focal points of the decentralization bill. However, the complexities of the decentralization bill made administration of the school board election difficult. Consequently, despite extensive legal assistance, many citizens and parents found that their intentions to run, vote and be counted did not actually materialize—the boards were captured by the elements incapable of responding to pressures for reform of the public education system of New York City.

How is it that an electoral mechanism guaranteed to include all minority opinions and groups succeeded in excluding them? This seeming paradox can be understood if we were to take another look at Parenti's views. Parenti likens the struggles of community groups today to the hectic period of the labor movement in the 18th century. For him, both reflect an attempt to legitimize new "rules of the game" for "acceptance of the rules is tantamount to permanent and continuous defeat for the rules are the weapons of the dominant interests."[16] Parenti seems to be saying that unless the rules of the game are changed no victory can ever come to protest groups except through a direct, meaningful delegation of powers. But do bureaucrats and politicians have the will to respond to such needs? Parenti's rejoinder is that "politicians react to demands, not needs . . . Needs do not become marketable demands unless backed by 'buying' or 'exchange power' so as to induce the producer (politician) to respond."[17] Blacks do not have such power. On this score, the pluralists argue that the inequalities of political resources are not cumulative. They contend that the poor have numbers even if they are deficient in money or leadership and that their failure is due to their inability to use this resource, not that the resources are non-existent.

This argument, apart from being specious, is tautological. It is a refuge into definition because the pluralists begin by saying that those who participate in the decision-making process have power. But these power theorists equivocate in their treatment of this proposition. If the non-participants are upper class, they are not influential. If they are lower class, they exercise "indirect" influence. In other words, they are yet to actualize their potential power. This contention bespeaks of volition—

if only they put their mind, effort and resources to it. But they did in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and they failed. Based on past frustrating experiences, they boycotted the recent school board elections because they saw it as an exercise in futility.

To achieve political effectiveness by activating large numbers of people, especially lower class citizens, necessitates a substantial command of time, manpower, publicity, organization, legitimacy, know-how and the ingredient that often determines the availability of the others—money. All these prerequisites were unavailable to the community people in the school board elections.) Thus, the power of numbers is qualified by class and cultural considerations (Appendix VI showing educational, vocational and occupational status of the members of the present school board to be middle and upper class)." If the poor had the economic resources to mobilize, they wouldn't be poor and would have less need to organize themselves.

In essence, Parenti's article concludes that acceptance of the present rules of the game is tantamount to permanent defeat, on the other hand, the attempt to establish new rules of the game is subject to the same factors which militate against them under the present rules. What then is the answer? What implication does it hold for the school board elections?

From this analysis, it seems clear that the community groups were defeated when they were excluded from having an input into the mechanism for electing the local boards. This evaluation has proved that the white, conservative, church and UFT backed boards resulted from a decentralization bill created without the consultation of community groups.

If the rules of the game cannot be changed through the competitive struggle in the political arena, then it is incumbent on the power holders to delegate meaningful powers to the community groups.

PART III: *Recommendations*

Registration

Pre-registration should be eliminated. All parents should be eligible to vote. Every polling-station should be provided with the register of parents by the principals of the schools within that district.

Districting

There should be smaller districts, numbering at least 60. Smaller districts would lead to more representative local school boards because the intimacy of the smaller districts would lend itself to greater community involvement as it did in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. In the experimental Ocean Hill-Brownsville, an 11,000 pupil district, 25% of a usually "politically- apathetic people" came out to vote. In the 1970 LSB election only 4.9% participated. Forty-eight percent of the winners of the LSB elections thought that the districts were too large. (These figures are based on a 33% response to a questionnaire sent out to the winners by the Institute for Community Studies).

Proportional Representation

Proportional representation should be abolished, because of its built-in tendency to pit well-organized groups against those that are less organized through the creation of slates. Instead of PR, direct elections should be instituted, but parents should elect parents (5) to the board while the non-parents should select non-parents (4). The creation and influence of slates might not be totally removed, but, at least, the overwhelming representation of non-parents would be curtailed.

Board of Examiners

This body should be abolished. Local boards should be given greater discretion in the selection of school personnel with state certification used as the basis of general qualification for teachers and administrators.

Powers of the LSB

Local school boards should have greater decision-making powers in the areas of budget, personnel and educational program. The local school boards must be given the right to participate in UFT contract negotiations. Under the present system, the powers of the boards with respect to budgetary, personnel and curriculum matters, are almost non-existent because the formula for spending the funds allocated by the City Board is dictated by a Union Contract which is binding on the local boards. For example, there is no reason why districts must be saddled with MES schools and other programs which necessitate more "prep" periods while denying the district the option to use that money to conduct other educational experiments which it might deem expedient.

Community Participation

The community must be given a greater participatory role in the decision-making process. As it now stands, the local school boards merely report their activities and decisions to the community with the latter having no mechanism, legal or procedural, to change these decisions.

Footnotes

[1] Appendix I
[2] Appendix II, IX
[3] Rhody McCoy, "The Year of the Dragon," in *Confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville*, ed. by Maurice R. Berube and Marilyn Gittell (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 58
[4] Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of The New York City Schools *Reconnection for Learning: A Community School System for New York City* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 18
[5] Ibid., p. 20
[6] Ibid., p. 18
[7] Ibid., p. 17
[8] Ibid., p. 17
[9] "A Summary of the 1969 School Decentralization Law for New York City", prepared by the Office of Education Affairs, p. 3
[10] New York *Post*, March 10, 1970, p. 3
[11] Public Education Agency *Newsletter*, February 18, 1970, p. 1
[12] United Bronx Parents *Newsletter*, January 16, 1970, p. 4
[13] Mayor's Panel, *Reconnection for Learning*, p. 20
[14] Ibid., p. 22
[15] Ibid., p. 22
[16] "A Summary of the 1969 School Decentralization Law for New York City", prepared by the Office of Educational Affairs Sec. VII
[17] Article 52-A, §2590-C, p. 20
[18] Article 52-A, §2590-G, p. 23-24
[19] United Bronx Parents *Newsletter*, February 25, 1970, p. 3
[20] Interview with Paul Greenberg, Executive Director of the Proportional Representation Campaign Committee, on August 18th, 1970 at his office
[21] Hannah Pitkin, *On Representation* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1967), p. 179
[22] Appendix I
[23] Appendix IV
[24] Coalition for an Effective Community School System *Newsletter*, February 16th, 1970, p. 3
[25] Letter to Coalition for an Effective Community School System by an election supervisor, March 21, 1970, p. 1
[26] Appendix V
[27] Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, Textbooks, 1962), pp. 235-236
[28] Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. 272
[29] Pitkin, *On Representation*, p. 88
[30] Interview with Paul Greenberg, August 15th, 1970
[31] Summary of 1969 School Decentralization Law
[32] Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism: A View From The Bottom", *Journal of Politics*, Vol 32, 1970, p. 508
[33] Mayor's Panel, *Reconnection for Learning*, pp. 19-20
[34] Article 52-A, §2590-B, p. 10
[35] Appendix IV
[36] Interview with Paul Greenberg, September 15, 1970
[37] Coalition for an Effective Community School System *Newsletter*, February 11, 1970, pp. 1-2
[38] Appendix VIII
[39] New York *Post*, February 6th, 1970, p. 3
[40] Mayor's Panel, *Reconnection for Learning*, p. 22
[41] New York *Post*, March 19, 1970, p. 2
[42] Long Island *Press*, Sunday, June 16th, 1970, p. 4
[43] Brooklyn *Spectator*, February 27, 1970, p. 9
[44] Brooklyn *Spectator*, February 2, 1970, p. 16
[45] Robert F. Lyke, "Representation and Urban School Boards" in *Community Control of Schools*, ed. by Henry M. Levin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), passim.
[46] Parenti, op. cit., p. 530
[47] Parenti, op. cit., p. 528
[48] Appendix VI

APPENDIX I

ANALYSIS OF ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS

District	*% Voting*	*Pupil % Population*				*Elected C.S.B. #*			
		PR	B	W	O*	PR	B	W	O*
Manhattan									
1	15	71	15	9	5	3		6	
2	9	31	13	37	19		1	7	1
3	8.3	31	50	18	1	2	1	6	
4	9	65	33	2		4	2	3	
5	5.6	16	82	1	1	2	7		
6	12.9	38	36	25		1	1	7	
Bronx									
7	9.8	66	32	2		5	2	2	
8	13.5	42	30	28			1	8	
9	7.4	40	45	15		3	4	2	
10	15.6	22	21	57		1		8	
11	15.2	12	33	55			1	8	
12	7.2	57	38	5		2	1	6	
Brooklyn									
13	7.7	22	73	5		1	3	5	
14	17.3	63	27	10		2	1	6	
15	14.0	49	17	34				9	
16	8.0	31	60	9		2	5	2	
17	7.7	19	69	12			3	6	
18	17.4	7	31	62				9	
19	13.3	33	50	17			2	7	
20	18.9	10	11	79				9	
21	14.8	8	11	81				9	
22	17.8	2	9	89				9	
23	4.9	28	71	1		2	6	1	
Queens									
24	14.8	16	13	71				9	
25	19.3	4	9	87			1	8	
26	22.0	2	13	85				9	
27	16.3	4	28	67				9	
28	12.2	6	41	53			3	6	
29	16.6	4	57	39			2	7	
30	13.4	14	20	66				9	
Richmond									
31	18.2	3	8	87				9	
TOTALS						30	47	201	1

* Oriental.

Source: United Parents Association, 1970.

APPENDIX II

SUMMARY OF DATA ON WINNERS OF LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS (1970)

*Occupation**

63.8%	Professional, technical or managerial position
10.3%	Employed as para-professionals or by poverty agencies
5.3%	In the clergy
16.6%	Housewives
4.0%	Laborers, mechanics

*Age**

41.8 years average age

Family†

81.9%	Married
	Average 2.2 children
46.8%	Have children now in public schools
63.8%	Did, will, or do have children in public schools
8.5%	Will send pre-school children to parochial schools

Years living in district†

11.8%	Less than 5 years
31.2%	5 to 15 years
57.0%	More than 15 years

Group Identification†

7.6%	Black
84.8%	White
7.6%	Spanish
36.0%	Jewish
50.6%	Catholic
11.2%	Protestant
2.2%	Other

* Figures based on 80% of winners who included this information in newspaper bibliographies.
† Figures based on 33% response of winners to questionnaire of the Institute for Community Studies.

APPENDIX III

NEW REGISTRANTS FOR SCHOOL BOARD ELECTION

Borough	*Regular**	*Parent**	*Total*
Manhattan	3,499	3,769	7,268
Bronx	5,527	3,632	9,159
Queens	6,423	2,340	8,763
Richmond	1,285	80	1,365
Brooklyn	8,692	5,214	13,906

* Regular: New registrants for all elections signing up for the school election as their first election.
Parent: Parents registering who, for one reason or another, could not vote in a general election.

APPENDIX IV

SCHOOL ELECTION DATA BY SCHOOL DISTRICT (1970)

Districts	*No. of Candidates On Ballot*	*Registered Voters Voting in School Election (%)*
1	22	15.0
2	43	9.0
3	35	8.3
4	18	9.0
5	18	5.6
6	17	12.9
	153	
7	15	9.8
8	26	13.5
9	21	7.4
10	38	15.6
11	55	15.2
12	11	7.2
	166	
13	23	7.7
14	33	17.3
15	39	14.0
16	19	8.0
17	25	7.7
18	39	17.4
19	29	13.3
20	39	18.9
21	58	14.8
22	67	17.8
23	17	4.9
	388	
24	31	14.8
25	47	19.3
26	41	22.0
27	43	16.3
28	33	12.2
29	36	16.6
30	33	13.4
	264	
31	80	18.2
	37	

APPENDIX V

PER DISTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF WINNING CANDIDATES ELECTED ON FIRST BALLOT, TRANSFER AND UNDER QUOTA BY SCHOOL DISTRICT

District	*First Ballot*	*% First Ballot*	*Transfer No.*	*%*	*Quota Under Neither*	*%*
1	2	22	7	= 77	0	= 0
2	2	22	3	33	4	44
3	0	0	5	55	4	44
4	1	11	8	88	0	0
5	2	22	7	77	0	0
6	3	33	6	66	0	0
7	4	44	5	55	0	0
8	2	22	7	77	0	0
9	2	22	5	55	2	22
10	1	11	6	66	2	22
11	0	0	5	55	4	44
12	3	33	5	55	1	11
13	0	0	7	77	2	22
14	1	11	5	55	3	33
15	0	0	5	55	4	44
16	2	22	4	44	3	33
17	3	33	4	44	2	22
18	0	0	5	55	4	44
19	2	22	3	33	4	44
20	1	11	4	44	4	44
21	0	0	7	77	2	22
22	1	11	5	55	3	33
23	1	22	7	77	0	0
24	2	22	5	55	2	22
25	2	22	4	44	3	33
26	0	0	8	88	1	11
27	1	11	6	66	2	22
28	2	22	6	66	1	11
29	3	33	4	44	2	22
30	1	11	7	77	1	11
31	3	33	0	5	6	66

Notes:

a) City-wide—of 279 school board members:
48 elected on first ballot = 17% of total members
164 elected on transfer ballot = 59% of total members
66 elected below quota = 24% of total members

b) On 23 boards the majority of candidates were elected in transfer ballots.

c) On 7 boards no candidate was elected in a first ballot quota.

d) On 21 boards at least 2 candidates from each board were elected with below quota votes.

e) Seven (7) had no candidate elected with less than quota votes.

APPENDIX VI

COMPARATIVE PROFILE OF LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS

	OCCUPATION					EDUCATION				ORGANIZATIONS			
Geographic Area Represented	Percentage of Board Members In Professional, Technical, or Managerial Positions	Percentage of Board Members employed as Para-professionals or by Poverty Agencies	Percentage of Members in the Clergy	Percentage of Members who are Housewives	Percentage of Members who are Laborers, Mechanics	Other	H.S. or Grade School	B.A., M.A.	Pro-fessional	Civic Affairs	P.A. P.T.A.	School Board	Public School Parents
Demonstration Districts (1967) Two Bridges	30	40		20	10		80	10	10	50	40		90
Ocean Hill-Brownsville	9	27	18	46			73		2	64	64	9	82
I.S. 201	9	64	9			18	82	9	9	73	64		82
Dem. Districts Average	16	44	9	22	3.3	6	78	6	15	62	56	3	85
N.Y.C. School Boards (1970) Average	63.8	10.3	5.3	16.6	4.0	10	33	56	23	59	27	25	46.8

39

APPENDIX VII

INVENTORY OF CANDIDATES' VIEWS*

1. *STATE OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM*	
a. Schools adequate	12%
b. Schools adequate for middle-class only	21%
c. Schools need major changes	59%
2. *COMMUNITY BOARD AND CENTRAL BOARD*	
a. Basic responsibility central	3%
b. Basic responsibility Community Board	79%
c. Community Board should be autonomous	13%
3. *COMMUNITY BOARD AND PROFESSIONAL STAFF*	
a. Comm. Bd. stays out of professional areas	8%
b. Comm. Bd. reviews staff implementation	77%
c. Comm. Bd. directs staff	6%
4. *SELECTION OF COMMUNITY SUPERINTENDENT*	
a. Educational experience first	43%
b. Community sensitivity first	39%
5. *STAFF SELECTION*	
a. Central assignment of staff	34%
b. Comm. Bd. assignment of staff	59%
6. *AID TO PAROCHIAL & PRIVATE SCHOOLS*	
a. Same subsidy as for public schools	5%
b. Lower subsidy than for public schools	37%
c. Fringe services only	27%
d. No aid at all	21%
7. *INTEGRATION*	
a. No longer desirable	6%
b. Desirable but not high priority	54%
c. Requires Comm. Bd. initiative	26%
8. *NARCOTICS PROBLEM*	
a. Emphasis on law enforcement	9%
b. Social factors must be dealt with	82%
9. *SEX EDUCATION*	
a . Home and church only	6%
b. Part of curriculum	85%
10. *MAJOR PROBLEM (Highest priority)*	
a. Better curriculum materials	12%
b. Better teachers	15%
c. Maintaining discipline	13%
d. Better school buildings	1%
e. Better supervision	11%
f. Achieving racial integration	1%
g. Other	31%

* Compiled by the Public Education Association and the League of Women Voters.

APPENDIX VIII

ELECTED COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS AND SLATE AFFILIATION‡

District†	Church	UFT	Community Based	Political Party	Independent*	Poverty Corporation	Newspaper Backing	PA	PTA	No Slate	Local Civic Group	Dist. Supt. & Incumb. Bd.
1					7	2						
2	3	3		4			3					
3										3		
4		2			2	2						
5												
6											4	
7		3						5				
8	5											
9	3	6	2									
10	9											
11	5			3								7
12												
13	4									1		
14	6					2				1		
15	6		6									
16										3		
17	6	4							4			
18	3	4	4						1		1	
19	3			6						3		
20	5	4								1		
21	3	5										
22	4											
23												
24	5	3			3							
25	5	2		1					5			
26	5	4						4		1		
27	6											
28										1		
29	6			1				5				
30							6		5		4	
31	3	6		1	1							
Total	95	46	12	16	13	6	9	14	15	14	9	7

† The number of elected school board members in some districts may add up to more than 9 since some people ran on more than one slate.
* Ad hoc group of people running together.
‡ Figures are on interviews with people in the respective districts. In districts where figures are not shown the information was not available.

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